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COMMENT
REGULATORY TAKING: A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
INTERIM DAMAGES
The clash between the fifth amendment just compensation clause
and the police power provides the backdrop for the role of a cause of
action for damages in a regulatory "taking" case. The government may
actually appropriate property for public use through the exercise of em-
inent domain.1 However, the fifth amendment requires just compensa-
tion for formally condemned property.2 The government also has police
power to regulate land use for the health, safety, and general welfare of
the public.3 When the government merely regulates land use through
the police power, the government does not have to award just
compensation.4
However, at some point, the police power to regulate land may go
so far as to effect a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment.6 Courts have struggled for decades to determine the threshold
issue of when an exercise of the police power "goes too far."6 Once a
court decides that a "taking" has occurred, the court must still deter-
mine the secondary issue of what remedies are appropriate.7 The reme-
1. This right to "take" property has been recognized for at least seven and a half centuries.
Section 39 of the Magna Carta (1215) provides that "[n]o free man shall be ... deprived of his
freehold . . . unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." F. Bos-
SELMAN. D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA. THE TAKING ISSUE 56 (1973). Typical public uses include
public utilities, highways, and urban renewal. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
2. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment makes the fifth amendment applicable to the states.
See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
3. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemna-
tion Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).
4. E. FREUND. THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904). Cf. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 180 (1971).
5. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
6. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
7. Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidations: The Availability of a Damages
Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711 (1982).
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dies question is even more perplexing than deciding whether a regula-
tion has become a "taking." Does the regulation become a "taking"
that merely requires invalidation of the regulation, or does the regula-
tion become a "taking" that requires damages?
According to a literal approach, deciding that a regulation has be-
come a "taking" suggests that an excessive regulation is a de facto ex-
ercise of eminent domain with the corresponding right to damages.'
Another approach suggests that the word "taking" is merely a meta-
phor for the point beyond which the government would have to resort
to its power of eminent domain.10 According to this view, regulations
that go beyond this point are merely invalid, with no corresponding
right to damages.'"
Thus, a landowner alleging excessive regulation has two alterna-
tives. The property owner may seek a declaration that the regulation is
invalid, 12 or he may seek damages for the unconstitutional invasion of
his property rights.' 3 If he decides to seek damages, he can rely upon
the fifth amendment just compensation clause. The fifth amendment
prohibition against "taking" is self-executing.' 4 Therefore, the land-
8. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
9. Comment, supra note 7, at 714; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For federal circuit court cases, see Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984), revd, 473
U.S. 172 (1985); Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983); Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F,2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1982);
Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043 (11th Cir. 1982);
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1199 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907
(1982). For state cases, see Pioneer Sand & Gravel v. Municipality of Anchorage, 627 P.2d 651,
652 n.2 (Alaska 1981); Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1383 (Fla. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Clifton v. Barry, 244 Ga. 78, 259 S.E.2d 35 (1979); Hamilton
v. Conservation Comm'n., 12 Mass. App. 359, 425 N.E.2d 358 (1981); Pratt v. State, 309
N.W.2d 767, 774 (Minn. 1981); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981);
Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 184 N.J. Super. II, 27-28, 445 A.2d 46, 54 (1982); Rippley v.
City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 510 (N.D. 1983); Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29
Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658 (1972), cert. denied, Chongris v. Corrigan, 409 U.S. 919 (1972);
Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 428-29, 334 N.W.2d 67, 72-73 (1983).
10. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 274, 598 P.2d 25, 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
376 (1979), affid on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of
New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593-94, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-9 (1976), appeal
dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); see also Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New
Direction in Land Use Lw?, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 1569, 1593 (1977) ("Holmes' famous words...
[are] little more than an exaggeration or a figure of speech").
II. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 274, 598 P.2d 25, 29, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 376 (1979), af'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
13. See. e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 81 Cal. App. 3d 844, 146 Cal. Rptr.
103 (1978), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
14. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
REGULATORY TAKING
owner may bring an action to compel just compensation even though
the government has not instituted formal condemnation proceedings.
This type of action is usually described as "inverse condemnation.' 15
Inverse condemnation has generally been available only in cases
involving direct physical invasion of property rights. 6 However, with
the expansion of land use restrictions, more landowners are bringing
inverse condemnation suits when those restrictions substantially inter-
fere with property rights. 17 As a result, the United States Supreme
Court has had to face the perplexing secondary issue of whether the
Court should allow inverse condemnation when land use regulation
"goes too far."' 8 The Supreme Court has characterized this issue as
"the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contempo-
rary land-use law . . . one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the
physicist's hunt for the quark."' 9
This Comment will focus on the narrow issue of whether the Su-
preme Court should allow a cause of action for interim damages. The
related issue of how to calculate such damages is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
I. THE THRESHOLD ISSUE: CAN A REGULATION BECOME A TAKING?
The Supreme Court first addressed the threshold issue in Mugler
v. Kansas.2 Mugler owned a brewery in Kansas when the state enacted
a prohibition statute. Mugler was convicted and fined $100 for manu-
facturing beer. On appeal, Mugler argued that the prohibition statute
constituted a taking of property without just compensation.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Justice Harlan, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, conceded that Mugler's brewery was "of
little value if not used for the purpose of manufacturing beer."'" How-
ever, the Court emphasized the distinction between an exercise of emi-
nent domain and the police power. While exercising the power of emi-
nent domain requires just compensation, this case involved the police
15. Id. Inverse condemnation differs from eminent domain in that the landowner, rather than
the government, initiates the action. Hence, the process is the inverse of a formal condemnation.
16. See Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zon-
ing Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1441-42 n.9 (1974).
17. See Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, 1980 INST. ON
PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 177, 179-81.
18. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
19. 450 U.S. at 649 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting C. HARR, LAND USE PLANNING
766 (3d ed. 1976)).
20. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
21. Id. at 657.
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power." Instead of physically invading Mugler's brewery, the state had
simply declared a use of property "to be injurious to the health, morals
or safety of the community .. ". ."I' The Court stated that this "can-
not, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of prop-
erty for the public benefit.'2 Thus, the Court held that when the gov-
ernment does not directly encroach upon private property, government
regulation will not be a taking. 5
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian.6 Hadacheck owned a brickyard, and the city annexed the area in
which the brickyard was located. The area gradually became residen-
tial. The city passed an ordinance that prohibited making bricks within
the city limits. Hadacheck was eventually jailed for violating the ordi-
nance, and he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. He contended that
the ordinance was unconstitutional since it decreased the value of his
property by 87.5%.27 Despite this substantial diminution in the value of
the regulated land, the Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a valid
exercise of the police power.2 8
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon29 the Court attempted to clar-
ify and refine its position on the threshold issue of whether a regulatory
taking had occurred. The coal company had acquired mineral rights by
conveying property with deeds that expressly reserved the right to re-
move all coal. The deeds conveyed only the surface, and the grantees
waived all claims for damages that might arise from the mining of coal.
In response to this type of practice, the Pennsylvania legislature passed
the Kohler Act. The statute prohibited the mining of coal in such a
way as to cause the subsidence of buildings. 30 A homeowner brought an
action to enjoin the coal company from mining under his land. The coal
company argued that the Kohler Act caused a taking of the company's
property. The coal company contended that the state could take the
company's property rights only by condemnation with just
compensation.
The Supreme Court held the Kohler Act unconstitutional.3 1 Jus-
22. Id. at 668.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 668-69.
25. Id.
26. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
27. Id. at 405.
28. Id. at 409-10.
29. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
30. Id. at 412-13.
31. Id. at 414.
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tice Holmes, writing for the majority, recognized the importance of the
police power: "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law."3 However, he stated that the police
power had its limits.3 3 One factor in determining such limits is the ex-
tent of diminution the regulation causes in the value of property.3 4
When that diminution reaches "a certain magnitude, in most if not in
all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensa-
tion to sustain the act."30 Accordingly, the question depends on the
particular facts of the case-an ad hoc approach. 36
In this particular case, Justice Holmes noted that only a single
house was involved, and that the statute was not enacted for public
safety. Therefore, he reasoned that the public interest did not warrant
this much government interference. Moreover, the extent of the "tak-
ing" was great. The statute purported to abolish the coal company's
estate in land.3 8
II. THE SECONDARY ISSUE: INVALIDATION OR DAMAGES?
In what has been described as "ambiguous dicta,"3 9 Justice
Holmes also stated in Pennsylvania Coal that "[tihe general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 40 What Jus-
tice Holmes meant by "taking" has caused considerable debate .4 Did
he mean "taking" that requires invalidation of the statute as a viola-
tion of the police power, or did he mean "taking" that requires just
compensation in conjunction with the power of eminent domain? What
Justice Holmes seemed to say is that if the police power to regulate
32. Id. at 413.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See. e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
37. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
38. Id. at 414.
39. See Comment, supra note 7, at 721.
40. 260 U.S. at 415; see also Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889).
41. State courts often interpret the fact that Pennsylvania Coal resulted in invalidation, in-
stead of damages, as disposing of any ambiguity. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266,
274, 598 P.2d 25, 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). But see San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649 n.14 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the
decision in French "tamper[s] with the express language of [Pennsylvania Coal]").
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"goes too far," it will result in an exercise of eminent domain, which
requires just compensation.
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis was anything but ambiguous when
he stated, "[T]he legislature has power to prohibit such uses without
paying compensation .... ,,42 Responding to Justice Holmes' dicta, he
reasoned that every regulation deprives the owner of some right in his
property. 43 However, regulating to protect the public health, safety, or
morals is not a "taking" that would require compensation. He drew an
analogy to a "public nuisance." 44 He also drew a distinction between
the power of eminent domain and the police power. Eminent domain
involves power exercised for the purpose of conferring benefits. "[Tihe
police power is exercised, not to confer benefits upon property owners,
but to protect the public from detriment and danger . . . .", Justice
Brandeis emphasized that regulated property remained in the posses-
sion of the owner. He also cited Mugler v. Kansas for the proposition
that government regulation is not invalid merely because it deprives the
owner of the only profitable use of his property.46
For the next forty years, the Supreme Court was silent on regula-
tory taking.4 ' Then, in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,48 the Court
had another opportunity to address the threshold issue of whether a
"taking" had occurred. Goldblatt owned a sand and gravel mining op-
eration. As a result of mining below the water table, there existed a
twenty acre lake with an average depth of twenty-five feet on Gold-
blatt's lot. Goldblatt excavated on his lot for several years and the town
gradually expanded to surround the excavation. Then, the town enacted
an ordinance that prohibited any excavation below the water table. The
town brought an action to enjoin further mining.
The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of the
police power.' 9 Justice Clark, writing for seven members of the Court,
reasoned that Goldblatt had the burden of proving that the ordinance
was a violation of the police power. Goldblatt had not produced evi-
dence that the ordinance reduced the value of his lot, so he failed to
42. 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 419.
45. Id. at 422.
46. Id. at 418 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
47. However, the Court did uphold comprehensive zoning as long as the zoning did not con-
stitute a violation of the police power. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of
Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
48. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
49. Id. at 596.
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carry that burden.50 Therefore, the Court did not even reach the
threshold issue of how far a regulation may go before it becomes a
"taking."
In dictum, Justice Clark discussed Mugler, Hadacheck, and Penn-
sylvania Coal."' He reaffirmed the ad hoc approach of Pennsylvania
Coal and the relevancy of comparing values of the property before and
after the regulation. However, he cited Mugler and Hadacheck for the
rule that a regulation that merely "deprives the property of its most
beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional. ' 52 He also cited
Pennsylvania Coal and stated, "This is not to say, however, that gov-
ernmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to
constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation. '"53
Taken at face value, Goldblatt would seem to clear up the ambi-
guity of what Justice Holmes meant by "taking." However, neither the
coal company in Pennsylvania Coal nor the owner of the gravel opera-
tion in Goldblatt was seeking damages. 5" Did Justice Clark mean a
"taking" that makes the regulation invalid, or did he mean a "taking"
that requires damages?
The Supreme Court considered regulatory taking again in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. 5 In accordance with
New York City's Landmark Preservation Law,56 the city designated
Grand Central Terminal as a "landmark." The owner of the terminal
subsequently planned to construct an office building of more than fifty
stories above the terminal's facade. The Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission rejected the plan. The owner brought an action in the New
York Supreme Court for an injunction. The trial court held the
landmarks law unconstitutional as applied to the owner's property and
granted the injunction. The Appellate Division reversed, 57 and the
Court of Appeals of New York affirmed,58 rejecting the owner's claim
that the landmarks law had "taken" property without just
compensation.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the landmarks law constitu-
50. Id.
51. Id. at 593-94.
52. Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 29 and 48.
55. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
56. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976).
57. 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
58. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
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tional.59 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, discussed the hold-
ings in the Court's previous "taking" cases. He reasoned that the owner
could still receive a profitable return on his investment since the
landmarks law did not interfere with the present uses of the building. 0
It was possible that the city might allow some less intensive construc-
tion in the air space above the terminal. The city had also transferred
the owner's development rights in the air space above the terminal to
another of the owner's properties."
Justice Brennan clarified the threshold issue by listing several fac-
tors to consider in the ad hoc determination of whether a regulatory
"taking" had occurred. He cited Goldblatt for considering "the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.162 He also relied on United States v. Causby,3 an inverse
condemnation case, for the proposition that "[a] 'taking' may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be character-
ized as a physical invasion by government.16 4
In Agins v. City of Tiburon6 the Supreme Court had its first real
opportunity to resolve the secondary issue. The plaintiffs owned a five-
acre tract of land. The city had adopted zoning ordinances placing the
land in a residential planned development and open-space zone which
would permit the owners to build between one and five single family
residences on the tract. The owners brought suit for a declaration that
the ordinances were unconstitutional. The owners also sought damages.
The city demurred, claiming that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action. The California Superior Court sustained the demurrer. 66
The California Supreme Court affirmed. 7 The court held that a
suit in inverse condemnation is not available in a regulatory "taking"
case. Accordingly, the exclusive remedy is invalidation of the regulation
in a suit for mandamus or declaratory relief. The California Supreme
Court reasoned that Justice Holmes' use of the word "taking" indi-
cated "the limit by which the acknowledged social goal of land control
59. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. Id. at 135.
61. Id. at 137.
62. Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)).
63. 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that low air flights over the landowner's chicken farm
constituted inverse condemnation).
64. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
65. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
66. The state superior court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their claim so as to seek a
declaratory judgment, but the plaintiffs did not take that opportunity.
67. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
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could be achieved by regulation rather than by eminent domain." 68 The
court reasoned that Justice Holmes had not even considered the possi-
bility of damages since no one had actually asked for compensation in
Pennsylvania Coal.69
The California court also relied on policy considerations. The court
cited "the need for preserving a degree of freedom in the land-use plan-
ning function, and the inhibiting financial force that inheres in the in-
verse condemnation remedy."' 70 In other words, allowing damages
would inhibit effective land use regulation since local governments
would be unable to pay.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari but declined
to consider the issue of damages. The owners had not "submitted a
plan for development of their property as the ordinances permit
.... "71 According to the Court, there was "as yet no concrete contro-
versy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions. 72 Jus-
tice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, did not address Justice
Holmes' use of the word "taking" or the policy considerations upon
which the California Supreme Court relied.
III. THE SOULUTION: INVALIDATION AND INTERIM DAMAGES?
In San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. City of San Diego"3 at
least four members of the Supreme Court adopted a literal translation
of Justice Holmes' use of the word "taking." The utility owned prop-
erty that was zoned industrial and agricultural. It intended to build a
nuclear power plant on its land. However, the city adopted an open-
space plan that prohibited construction, and the city proposed a bond
issue to acquire lands such as the utility's property. When the bond
issue failed, the utility brought suit for mandamus, declaratory relief,
and damages. A bench trial resulted in more than three million dollars
in damages. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Califor-
nia Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its inter-
vening opinion in A gins. The court of appeal reversed its previous hold-
ing on the rationale that the California Supreme Court's decision in
Agins " precluded a damage award. The court of appeal found that the
68. Id. at 274, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 276, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
71. 447 U.S. at 260.
72. Id.
73. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
74. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
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record presented "disputed fact issues not covered by the trial court in
its finding and conclusions," which would be available "should [appel-
lant] elect to retry the case."' 75 The California Supreme Court denied
further review.
The United States Supreme Court could not agree with the hold-
ing below. According to the majority, the California Court of Appeal
had not decided the threshold issue of whether a "taking" had oc-
curred.76 The court of appeal had merely remanded the case to the trial
court.77 Therefore, the majority of the Supreme Court dismissed be-
cause of the absence of a final judgment.
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, argued that the majority
had fundamentally mischaracterized the holding of the California
Court of Appeal.78 According to Justice Brennan, the California Court
of Appeal had reached a final judgment. That court had held, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, that no cause of action is available
for damages. Therefore, Justice Brennan argued that the Supreme
Court should have decided the case on the merits.
More importantly, Justice Brennan expressed the views of at least
four Justices on the damages issue. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Powell joined in the dissent. The dissent recognized state court opinions
that had interpreted Justice Holmes as "metaphorically" using the
word "taking. '79 Justice Brennan stated that "[i]n addition to tamper-
ing with the express language of the opinion [in Pennsylvania Coal],
this view ignores the coal company's repeated claim before the Court
that the Pennsylvania statute took its property without just compensa-
tion."80 Thus, at least four members of the Court adopted a literal
translation of what Justice Holmes meant by "taking."
The dissent also argued that police power regulations can destroy
the use of property just as effectively as formal condemnation or physi-
cal invasion of property. Consequently, "[i]t is only logical, then, that
government action other than acquisition of title, occupancy, or physi-
cal invasion can be a 'taking,' and therefore a de facto exercise of the
power of eminent domain, where the effects completely deprive the
owner of all or most of his interest in the property." 8'
According to Justice Brennan, the purpose of the just compensa-
75. 450 U.S. at 631-32 (quoting the California Court of Appeal).
76. 450 U.S. at 631 n.1l.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. See cases cited supra note 41.
80. 450 U.S. at 649 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 653.
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tion clause is to prevent the government from forcing individuals to
bear burdens that the public as a whole should bear. In his view, "once
a court establishes that there was a regulatory 'taking,' the Constitu-
tion demands that the government entity pay just compensation for the
period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,'
and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or
otherwise amend the regulation." 2 He said that the express words and
purpose of the just compensation clause support this interpretation.
Justice Brennan argued that as soon as the government "takes" private
property, "the landowner has already suffered a constitutional viola-
tion."" s He stated that the just compensation requirement of the fifth
amendment is not precatory-any "taking" must be compensated." He
argued that the fifth amendment expressly guarantees just compensa-
tion. 85 As such, "the applicability of express constitutional guarantees
is not a matter to be determined on the basis of policy judgments made
by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches."8 6 Thus, at least four
members of the Court dismissed policy considerations as irrelevant to
the issue of damages. At least four Justices also endorsed interim dam-
ages as a proper remedy in a regulatory taking case.
The dissenters did not endorse any particular rule for lower courts
to use in calculating interim damages. "The States should be free to
experiment in the implementation of this rule, provided that their cho-
sen procedures and remedies comport with the fundamental constitu-
tional command.18 7 As a starting point, the dissent suggested
"[o1rdinary principles determining the proper measure of just compen-
sation, regularly applied in cases of permanent and temporary 'takings'
involving formal condemnation proceedings, occupations and physical
invasions .. . .-8 These "ordinary principles" suggest that the proper
measure of interim damages should include the "market rental value"
of the property which is "taken," as well as incidental expenses of the
property owner.89
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist apparently agreed with
82. Id.
83. Id. at 654 (emphasis in original).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 661.
87. Id. at 660.
88. Id. at 658-59.
89. See Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57
INDIANA L. 45 (1982) for a discussion of the proper measure of interim damages.
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the dissent's endorsement of interim damages."' However, Justice
Rehnquist agreed with the majority that there had been no final judg-
ment below. He stated that he would feel better able to decide the
damages issue if he knew "what disposition the California courts finally
made of this case."91
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamil-
ton Bank of Johnson City92 three additional Justices assumed arguendo
that damages are available. In Williamson, the bank's predecessor in
interest had obtained the planning commission's approval of a "cluster"
development. However, the planning commission subsequently disap-
proved of the plat for several reasons. As a result of the commission's
objections, the developer claimed that the commission had allowed the
developer to build only sixty-seven units. This was 409 fewer units than
the planning commission's previous approval had allowed.9 3 The bank
filed a Section 19839" claim in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee. The jury awarded $350,000 for the
"temporary taking" of the property. The court also entered a perma-
nent injunction against the planning commission. The district court
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the damages issue.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the dissent in San Diego
Gas and reinstated the jury verdict. 95 However, the United States Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded.96
Justice Blackmun, writing for four members of the Court, held
that the Section 1983 claim was not ripe.9 7 He stated that the devel-
oper had not sought variances to the cluster zoning ordinance. He also
reasoned that Tennessee had adequate procedures for inverse condem-
nation and that "a property owner [must] utilize procedures for ob-
taining compensation before bringing a section 1983 action."98 Even
assuming arguendo that the fifth amendment requires payment of dam-
ages, the respondent had not used the procedures Tennessee provides
for obtaining just compensation.
Justice Powell took no part in the decision. Justice White dissented
from the holding that the case was not ripe. Justice Brennan, with Jus-
90. 450 U.S. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 636.
92. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
93. Id. at 3115.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
95. 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984).
96. 105 S. Ct. at 3124.
97. Id. at 3117.
98. Id. at 3121 n.13.
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tice Marshall joining, concurred in the Court's opinion without depart-
ing from their views in San Diego Gas."'
Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment, but he went fur-
ther to express his views on the damages issue: "The fact that a jurist
as eminent as Oliver Wendell Holmes characterized a regulation that
'goes too far' as a 'taking' does not mean that such a regulation may
never be cancelled and must always give rise to a right of compensa-
tion."' 10 0 According to Justice Stevens, nothing in the Constitution enti-
tles recovery for a temporary harm. 01
Two additional Justices adopted a literal translation of "taking" in
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County.'0 A developer bought
a forty acre plot of land and submitted a subdivision proposal to the
Yolo County Planning Commission. MacDonald's plan called for 159
single family and multifamily residential lots on the forty acres. The
County Board of Supervisors had previously zoned the land residential,
but MacDonald's predecessors had used the land for agricultural pur-
poses only. The Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors de-
nied the plan for several reasons: 1) inadequate access by public street;
2) inadequate sewer service; 3) inadequate police protection; and 4)
inadequate water service. 03
MacDonald filed suit against the county in California Superior
Court, seeking an injunction and damages. MacDonald claimed that
the county had denied it the entire economic use of its property for the
sole purpose of providing a public, open-space buffer. The superior
court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed on the basis of its previ-
ous decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon.104 The court reasoned that
damages are available only when the government takes some type of
physical control over the land. Setting aside the regulation as unconsti-
tutional was the only remedy available. According to the court, Mac-
Donald may have a cause of action for an injunction, but not for
damages.
The California Supreme Court denied certiorari, but the United
99. Id. at 3124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring). See text accompanying note 78.
100. Id. at 3125-26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 3126-27.
102. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
103. Id. at 2563.
104. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
See MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2565, for the Supreme Court's discussion of the reasoning of the
California Court of Appeal.
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States Supreme Court granted review. The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether MacDonald had stated a cause of action for dam-
ages. However, a majority of the Supreme Court declined to reach the
damages issue because the case was not ripe.
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the majority conceded that a
land regulation might be unconstitutional if that regulation "goes too
far" in regulating land use.105 However, the majority stated that the
Court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone too far unless
the Court knows how far the regulation goes. Justice Stevens argued
that Yolo County had denied "only one intense type of residential de-
velopment." 10 6 MacDonald "still has yet to receive the Board's 'final,
definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to
the particular land in question.' "1107
Four dissenters emphasized the procedural posture of this case and
argued that MacDonald was merely seeking a cause of action. 10 8 Ac-
cordingly, they believed that the Court should interpret the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. MacDonald had alleged in his
complaint " '[tlhat any application for a zone change, variance, or
other relief would be futile.' "109
Two of the dissenters, Chief Justice Burger and Justice White,
would have allowed a cause of action for interim damages. Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice White were "in substantial agreement with
Justice Brennan's discussion in San Diego Gas."' 10 The other two dis-
senters, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist, would have remanded
the case on the issue of interim damages to allow the state courts to
address the issue. These two dissenters characterized the interim dam-
ages issue as "multifaceted and difficult.""
IV. WILL THE COURT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTERIM
DAMAGES?
The Supreme Court has long recognized the clash between the po-
lice power and the fifth amendment just compensation clause. " ' The
early cases held that land use regulation is a valid exercise of the police
105. 106 S. Ct. at 2566 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
106. Id. at 2568 n.8.
107. Id. at 2568 (quoting Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3119).
108. Id. at 2569 (White, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2573 (White, J., dissenting).
I11. Id. at 2574 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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power.113 However, the Court also held that a regulation which "goes
too far" becomes a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. 1 4
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has settled on an ad hoc ap-
proach for deciding the threshold issue of whether a "taking" has oc-
curred. In Pennsylvania Coal, a 100 percent diminution in a property
right was a "taking."'15 But an 87.5 percent decrease in property value
was not enough in Hadacheck.'11 The Court has recognized various
factors to consider in its ad hoc approach.' 17 Nevertheless, Pennsylva-
nia Coal is the only Supreme Court case to hold that a land use regula-
tion went too far. 8
The Court has also recognized the perplexing nature of the sec-
ondary issue: What remedies are available when the regulation "goes
too far?"119 Does the regulation become a "taking" that merely re-
quires invalidation, or does the regulation become a "taking" that re-
quires the payment of damages? According to the literal approach, de-
ciding that a regulation has become a "taking" suggests that an
excessive regulation is a de facto exercise of the power of eminent do-
main that gives rise to the right of damages in inverse condemnation. 0
The metaphorical approach suggests that finding a "taking" merely re-
quires invalidation of the excessive regulation.' 1 According to this
view, the word "taking" is a metaphor for the point beyond which the
government would have to resort to formal condemnation proceedings
in order to accomplish the government's objectives.
The Court has granted certiorari in cases involving the damages
issue four times in the last seven years.' As of yet, the Court has
failed to reach the merits. In San Diego Gas, the absence of a final
judgment stood in the way. In Agins, Williamson, and MacDonald, the
cases were not ripe. These recent cases demonstrate the tremendous
113. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
114. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
115. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
116. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
117. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
118. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); cf Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (just
compensation for a physical taking of a navigational servitude); see also Kmiec, supra note 89.
119. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
120. See cases cited supra note 9.
121. See cases cited supra note 10.
122. For a recent case noting probable jurisdiction, see First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 3292 (1986).
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prudential hurdles an aggrieved landowner must overcome. The cases
also provide an insight as to how the Supreme Court may hold on the
damages issue.
San Diego Gas provides the most insight as to a future holding. In
his dissent, Justice Brennan expressed the views of at least four mem-
bers of the Court.12 As a result, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell,
and Stewart went on record as endorsing interim damages as a remedy.
They took the literal approach and dismissed any policy considerations
as inapplicable to express constitutional guarantees. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Rehnquist had little difficulty agreeing with much of
Justice Brennan's dissent.12 4 In Williamson, Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor assumed arguendo that damages are an appropriate rem-
edy.125 More significantly, Justice Stevens endorsed the metaphorical
approach that would recognize invalidation as the only remedy availa-
ble.1"6 Finally, in MacDonald, Chief Justice Burger and Justice White
substantially agreed with Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego
Gas. 127
As a result of these recent cases, five of the Justices currently serv-
ing on the Court have endorsed a cause of action for damages. All five
Justices have adopted the views expressed in the San Diego Gas dis-
sent. If an aggrieved landowner can overcome prudential concerns such
as ripeness and the threshold issue of whether a "taking" has occurred,
the Supreme Court will probably recognize a cause of action.
If the dissent in San Diego Gas is any indication, the Court will
not base its holding upon policy considerations. In Justice Brennan's
words, "the applicability of express constitutional guarantees is not a
matter to be determined on the basis of policy judgments made by the
legislative, executive, or judicial branches."12 8
V. CONCLUSION
The fifth amendment expressly provides: "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. ' ' How-
ever, the courts have struggled for decades with the proper definition of
123. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 637, 649, 653-54, 658-
61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Kmiec, supra note 89.
124. 450 U.S. at 633-34, 636 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
125. 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3115-24.
126. Id. at 3 125-26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. 106 S. Ct. at 2573 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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"taken." This struggle indicates much confusion on what the fifth
amendment "expressly guarantees." The Constitution does not exist in
a vacuum. As the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court must
interpret the Constitution in light of an ever-changing world.130 Policy
considerations should play an important role-especially when there is
confusion over "express constitutional guarantees."
The Court should weigh the same policy considerations as the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court weighed in Agins.' s' Widespread land use regu-
lation is a relatively new concept. The United States Supreme Court
first upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1926.132 Since then,
courts have realized that we must permit community planners a great
deal of flexibility. If we hold local planners liable for inverse condem-
nation, the process of community planning might grind to a halt.
Local planners must be able to cope with tremendous problems in
our cities and the need to preserve our natural resources. They must
also be able to plan in order to protect residential property values.
"This threat of unanticipated financial liability will intimidate legisla-
tive bodies and will discourage the implementation of strict or innova-
tive planning measures in favor of measures which are less stringent,
more traditional, and fiscally safe."'133 This threat would have a chilling
effect on the exercise of the police power--the power of local planners
to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of the general public.
It may also be "a usurpation of legislative power for a court to
force compensation.' 3 4 Indeed, some zoning ordinances are enacted by
the voters through direct initiatives. Should the courts hold the voters
liable for inverse condemnation? Should the courts give voters this "un-
welcome power to inadvertently commit funds from the public
treasury?"" a3
Justice Brennan addressed some of these policy considerations in
San Diego Gas. In a footnote, he expressed doubts as to whether the
threat of inverse condemnation would greatly impede the efforts of land
use planners."3 6 He suggested that the threat of liability might produce
a more rational basis of decision making in land use planning. This
threat could "also encourage municipalities to err on the constitutional
130. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
131. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
132. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
133. Note, supra note 10, at 1597.
134. Note, supra note 16, at 1451.
135. Note, supra note 10, at 1598 (emphasis in original).
136. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. at 661 n.26 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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side of police power regulations, and to develop internal rules and oper-
ating procedures to minimize overzealous regulatory attempts.""1 7
In spite of Justice Brennan's suggestions, there are strong policy
reasons for allowing local planners a great deal of flexibility. The Court
can allow a cause of action for interim damages and preserve much of
this flexibility.
In the future, the Court should emphasize the procedural posture
of cases similar to MacDonald; the Court should recognize that it
would merely be allowing a cause of action. By allowing the cause of
action, the Court can view the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. On remand, the plaintiff will still have to prove that a "tak-
ing" has occurred-the threshold issue. The Court should emphasize
that this is a very difficult hurdle to overcome. Indeed, Pennsylvania
Coal is the only Supreme Court case to hold that a regulatory "taking"
had occurred. 138 There, the regulation completely destroyed the prop-
erty interest-a 100 percent diminution in value.139 On the other hand,
an 87.5 percent diminution was not a "taking" in Hadacheck.1 40 By
allowing a cause of action for interim damages, the Court can provide
for the case in which the government regulation "goes too far." By
emphasizing how rare such a case might be, the Court can preserve the
flexibility municipalities need for effective land use planning.
William Howell Freeman, Jr.
137. Id.
138. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
139. Id.
140. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405-10 (1915).
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